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Increasingly, consumers depend on social information channels, such as user-posted online reviews, to make
purchase decisions. These reviews are assumed to be unbiased reflections of other consumers' experiences
with the products or services. While extensively assumed, the literature has not tested the existence or non-
existence of review manipulation. By using data from Amazon and Barnes & Noble, our study investigates if
vendors, publishers, and writers consistently manipulate online consumer reviews. We document the
existence of online review manipulation and show that the manipulation strategy of firms seems to be a
monotonically decreasing function of the product's true quality or the mean consumer rating of that product.
Hence, manipulation decreases the informativeness of online reviews. Furthermore though consumers
understand the existence of manipulation, they can only partially correct it based on their expectation of the
overall level of manipulation. Hence, vendors are able to change the final outcomes by manipulating online
reviewers. In addition, we demonstrate that at the early stages, after an item is released to the Amazon
market, both price and reviews serve as quality indicators. Thus, at this stage, a higher price leads to an
increase in sales instead of a decrease in sales. At the late stages, price assumes its normal role, meaning a
higher price leads to a decrease in sales. Finally, on average, there is a higher level of manipulation on Barnes
& Noble than on Amazon.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The rapid adoption of Web 2.0 has unleashed a wave of
innovations that might change the way customers acquire informa-
tion to make product purchases or stock investment decisions. The
growth ofWeb 2.0 has enabled consumers to post reviews describing
their experiences with products, product vendors, or service
providers and make them available to other prospective consumers.
In fact, the marketing literature suggests that consumers depend on
online product reviews to make purchase decisions [3,5]. Capital
markets research has revealed that the information conveyed by
stock message boards are used by investors [1], and a shock to the
message board postings is negatively associated with future stock
returns [12].
Since consumers increasingly depend on information released
through social online channels, such as consumer-generated content,
to make product or services purchase decisions, the quality and
truthfulness of information available to them is important. Do various
entities, such as companies, vendors, publishers, or writers, actively
engage in word-of-mouth manipulation, either directly or indirectly,
with the goal of changing consumers' final decisions? Such practices
are not new for information released through traditional information
channels. For example, a rich earnings management literature has
revealed that managers deliberately misrepresent financial reports in
order to smooth their firm's income, meet a pre-specified target, and
get better compensation.
We define review fraud as occurring when online vendors,
publishers, or authors write “consumer” reviews by posing as real
customers. An email interview with Jonathan Carson, CEO of
BuzzMetrics, reveals that promoting new CD releases through chat
promotion is almost an industry standard [11]. Such a practice exists
even for highly reputable vendors, such as Amazon. In April 2004
James Marcus, a former senior editor for Amazon.com, wrote an
alarming article in The Washington Post to discuss review fraud. Based
on an analysis of reviews of just a few thousand reviewers, he found
that a large number of authors on Amazon had got favorable reviews
from their friends, relatives, colleagues or paid professionals. In some
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cases, these authors even wrote reviews for their own books.1
Furthermore, such fraud has caused financial loss to society as well.2
Recent research concludes that word-of-mouth (WOM) commu-
nication is a valuable marketing resource for consumers and market-
ers with critical implications for a product's success. This literature
provides useful insights by linking online reviews with sales. It shows
a positive correlation between the average review score and product
sales [4–6]. However, there is one implicit but essential assumption in
this literature that researchers take for granted as being true, which is:
Assumption 1. Online reviews are written by actual previous custo-
mers, not publishers or vendors, etc. Therefore, online reviews reflect
either the actual product quality or the product's relative true quality.
If the above assumption is true, then online reviews should reflect
a products' true quality; or, all other information (e.g., price, product
category, manufacturer, vendor, and shipping terms) being the same,
a product with a higher mean consumer product rating should be
assumed to have higher quality. This assumption is crucial in
justifying the linkage between online reviews and sales. However,
the existence of review fraud would invalidate such an assumption
and cast doubts on the association between product quality and
consumer reviews. If online reviews are indeed written by actual
previous customers, then online reviews can help new customers
reduce the uncertainties involved in inferring product quality, thus
resulting in an increased conversation rate and higher sales. However,
if online vendors, publishers, and authors are all able to write
“consumer” reviews, then instead of being an uncertainty “reducer”,
online reviews might become an uncertainty enhancer. In such a case,
consumers' beliefs about product quality and vendor reputations
derived from online reviews might be totally misleading.
To date, there have been a few analytical studies investigating
review fraud [2,11]. Drawing on the observation that the music
industry is known to hire professional marketers to write favorable
consumer opinions to promote the sales of new albums, Mayzlin [11]
built an analytical game theory model in which two competing firms
send anonymous messages recommending their own products.
Dellarocas [2] analytically shows that if every firm's manipulation
strategy monotonically increases with regard to that firm's true
quality, then manipulation of online reviews increases the informa-
tiveness of online reviews. Under such a circumstance, manipulation
increases the separation of the distributions of ratings and will help
consumers make better purchase decisions. Even if there is manip-
ulation, consumers are smart and can adjust their interpretation of
online opinions accordingly [2]. Combining the implicit assumption
stated above (Assumption 1) with these analytical works, we have the
following revised assumption based on previous literature:
Assumption 2. Online reviews are written by actual previous
customers and not publishers or vendors. Even if there is manipula-
tion, consumers are smart and can adjust their interpretation of online
opinions accordingly [2]. Further, as long as the manipulation is
monotonically increasing with regard to a product's true quality (i.e.,
if it is more likely for higher quality vendors to engage in review
manipulation), then online reviewswith the existence of review fraud
are even more informative than when there is no review fraud.
If consumers are indeed smart and if the manipulation is
monotonically increasing with respect to (w.r.t) to product quality,
then we need not worry about empirically testing manipulation of
online reviews because under such a circumstance, online reviews are
more informative. However, are these assumptions true?
In this paper, we analytically and empirically study temporal
behaviors of online reviewsandaddress the following researchquestions:
• Does review fraud actually exist? Is reviewmanipulation a prevalent
phenomenon or does it just happen occasionally?
• What types of vendors are more likely to manipulate online
reviews: those selling high-quality products or those selling low-
quality products? Vendors that receive higher average ratings for
their products, or those with lower average ratings?
• Are consumers smart enough to filter out the manipulation as
Dellarocas [2] suggests? Are they able to correct for this bias in their
purchase decisions? What quality indexes do they use to make
purchase decisions in view of the existence of review fraud?
• Is online review fraud a common phenomenon across different
websites?
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 studies the mean-reverse
phenomenon of consumer reviews to motivate our study. By studying
the temporal patterns of online reviews, we show that there might be
two potential drivers which are consumer taste difference and/or
review manipulation that force rating decreases over time. As a nature
follow-up question of Section 2, Section 3 answers whether a pure
consumer taste difference without manipulation can be the sole
underlying driving force. We conclude that we cannot rule out
manipulation as one of the potential drivers. The temporal patterns of
online reviews can be either driven by pure manipulation or by a joint
force of consumer taste difference and manipulation. Section 4 seeks to
answer the question ofwhether low-quality or high-quality vendors are
more likely to manipulate consumer reviews. Section 5 analyzes
whether consumers correct for manipulation bias when making
purchase decisions. Section 6 answers how customers make purchase
decisions when manipulation exists. Section 7 checks the robustness of
our findings by comparing the online review manipulation between
Amazon and Barnes & Nobel. Section 8 contains discussion of the
findings, their implications, and some concluding remarks.
2. How do consumer reviews evolve over time?
Westudy the time-seriespropertyof online consumer reviewsbased
on empirical data collected fromAmazon.com to reveal whywe suspect
that vendors, publishers, and authors might consistently manipulate
online reviews. Before we discuss our analytical and empirical models,
we first discuss where and how we collected our data.
2.1. Data
We collected our data from Amazon Web Service (AWS) and
constructed two datasets to examine our research questions. The first
dataset is cross-sectional data composed of a random sample of books,
DVDs, and videos. For this dataset,we collected the product information
and corresponding consumer reviews from Amazon.com in July 2005.3
The second dataset is a panel dataset composed of a sequence of online
review information (price, sales, and review information) for a sample
of books, DVDs, and videos collected over several months at approx-
imately three-day intervals. The initial items in this panel dataset were
randomly chosen from Amazon in July 2005. For the panel data
collection, since it occurs approximately every three days, we identified
each data collection batch by a unique sequence number. Because we
need to know both the true product quality and the perceived product
quality that consumers used to make purchase decisions, we used the
1 http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A61073-2004Apr8?language=
printer.
2 According to http://www.clickfraudreport.com/1.html, the essence of click fraud is
“any click where there is no intention by the clicker to purchase, browse or gain
information from the website they visit. And the only goal of a click is to either to drain
your marketing budget or generate revenue from the click”. Even though we cannot
find a dollar amount lose due to review fraud, we believe it is comparable to click
fraud.
3 This study is based on data collected in July 2005. We performed similar data
analysis using data collected in February, March, and April of 2005, which rendered
similar results.
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panel dataset to answer the questions as to whether consumers
understand the existence of online review manipulation (Section 5)
and how consumers make purchase decisions with the existence of
reviewmanipulation (Section 6). For the rest of the research questions,
we use the cross-sectional datasets.
Because of some technical glitches in AWS, for the panel data, we
had to exclude certain sequences in which only partial data were
collected. For example, during several sessions, AWS did not respond
to our queries or was offline and we were therefore able to process
only partial or no data during these sessions. Each session is identified
by a unique batch number. In total, we obtained 26 batches of review
and item-level data. Table 1 provides summary statistics for our cross-
sectional and panel data. On Amazon.com, consumers can report only
an integer product review on a 1-star to 5-star scale, where 1-star =
least satisfied and 5-star = most satisfied. The average review scores
for books, DVDs, and videos are overwhelmingly favorable, reflected
by the high average product reviews.
2.2. What does the order (relative time) mean?
To study how consumer reviews evolve over time, we first define a
new termcalled “order” to represent the relative time. Order 1means the
first review every product received; Order 2 represents the second
review every product received; and so on. In our study, we use relative
time (order) instead of absolute time because each item sold on Amazon
has its own release date and therefore its own absolute age on Amazon.
This absolute age varies from 1month to several years with a very large
variance. Thus it is difficult to compare the change in review scores over
time based on an absolute time. Since we are interested in the temporal
properties of online reviews, using relative time allows us to pull items
with different absolute ages together, under the assumption that reviews
of different items have similar trends over time. In our later regression
analysis,wedid control the potential confounding effect of absolute time.
2.3. Potential drivers for reviews decrease over time
We first look at how consumer reviews change over time. Assume
that there is nomanipulation (online reviews are all given by previous
customers) and no self-selection bias (later customers share the same
tastes as early customers when evaluating the same product). Assume
that a consumer will realize the true quality of a product after
purchasing it and will truthfully report his/her opinion about that
product. Thus, the online rating rit for product i with qi at time t is:
rit = qi + εit ð1Þ
where εit∼N(0,σit2) represents the difference between the product's
true quality and its online rating for product i at time t. Thus, the
average consumer rating for the tth review of all K items is
rt =
1
k
∑
K
i=1
rit = q + εt ; where q =
1
k
∑
K
i=1
qi and εt =
1
k
∑
K
i=1
εit : ð2Þ
It is obvious that rt should not change over time with the above
assumptions. To test whether this is true, we chose those items out of
our cross-sectional data that have received more than 100 consumer
ratings4 to make sure that these items have been in the market long
enough to demonstrate their temporary pattern. We ended up with
1526 books, 2231 DVDs, and 2763 Videos. We estimate the average
ratings of all items at each order (as Eq. (2)) and present the results in
Fig. 1.
Fig. 1 shows that rt decreases (with decreasing rate) with elapsed
time. This raises the question:Why do the mean ratings decrease over
time? Two potential drivers might be able to explain this kind of
phenomenon:
• There are systematic differences between early customers and later
customers, consistent with the higher-taste-self-selection theory
proposed by Li and Hitt [9]. Normal consumer reviews of early
periods are systematically positively biased, which leads to a
decrease trend over time [9]. In addition, the researchers document
that consumers are not fully rational because they do not fully
correct for the review bias that occurs due to the self-selection.
However, one embedded assumption in their paper is that there is
no review manipulation and all reviews are truthful.
• There is a systematic positive manipulation from the vendors,
publishers, and/or authors of the online reviews. This positive
manipulation decreases with elapsed time as well, resulting in a
decreasing trend of reviews over time. The reason for the positive
manipulation bias at the early stage is linked to the cost and benefit
of manipulation. Normally when an item is first available to an E-
commerce market, there are very few consumer reviews, so the
manipulation cost at this stage is relatively low because vendors
need to write only a few reviews to change the mean consumer
reviews. Also, vendors, authors, and publishers have higher
incentives to engage in manipulating online reviews at this stage
as well because it is at this phase that reviews have the highest
impact on sales [8]. As time passes, this product will receive a large
number of authentic consumer reviews. Under such a scenario, the
cost tomanipulate the outcomes of consumer reviews becomes very
high.5 From this point on, we assume that the likelihood of
publishers, authors, and vendors manipulating online reviews
decreases over time.
Therefore there are two competing processes that might cause
mean consumer rating to decrease over time (Fig. 1). These two
possibilities paint two different pictures. One believes that all reviews
are truthful, while the other one hypothesizes that some reviews are
Table 1
Summary statistics.
Category #Reviews #Amazon items #Distinct items Average rating
Panel A: Amazon cross-sectional data (July 2005)
Book 967,075 54,431 54,431 4.02
DVD 2,034,552 32,413 32,413 4.19
Video 1,248,992 44,489 44,489 3.99
Total 4,250,619 131,333 131,333 4.09
Panel B: Amazon panel data (July 2005–January 2006)
Book 6,759,764 261,187 10,052 3.87
DVD 4,056,340 258,736 9988 4.07
Video 4,371,833 259,736 10,000 4.02
Total 15,187,937 779,659 30,040 3.97
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Fig. 1. Mean consumer ratings (rt) over time (order).
4 Changing the cut-off point to another number, such as 130, 120, 110, etc., does not
change our results qualitatively. We also make sure that the exact items included for
each order are the same so that what we observed is really associated with the time
instead of the item difference.
5 Since a product receives a lot of reviews, vendors need to post a decent number of
biased reviews to fight with unfavorable reviews and make the manipulation work. On
a lot of websites, this can be very time consuming and costly.
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manipulated; one proposes that consumers are not able to fully
correct self-selection bias, while the other one believes that
consumers are smart enough to filter out the review manipulation.
Is self-selection alone sufficient to explain the phenomena that the
mean consumer rating decreases over time as Li and Hitt [9]
observed? Are consumers really as smart as suggested by Dellarocas
[2]?
Before we pursue the answer, let's first show why we suspect that
there might be another potential driving force besides self-selection
bias: manipulation with decreasing magnitude over time.
2.4. Why do we suspect that there might be review fraud?
To find out why we suspect that there might be systematic
manipulation from book publishers, sellers, and/or authors in online
product reviews, we adopt a portfolio approach using online review
information from Amazon.com. The meaning of a portfolio in our
context is different from that of a traditional finance context, where a
portfolio represents a basket of securities typically designed to reduce
risk. Our portfolio here is comprised of products and events (good and
bad) that share similar characteristics.
There are two event types of interest in this study: good news
events and bad news events. In our context, a good (bad) news event
occurs when the newly released review for an item has a higher
(lower) score than the average of its previous review scores. We are
interested in knowing for those items that received good (bad) news
from time t−1 to t (current period), generally how will their product
ratings be changed from time t to t+1 (future period), and generally
how were their product ratings changed from time t−2 to t−1
(previous period).6
Fig. 2 shows that out of all the items that received good reviews in
the current period, 78.58% will receive bad reviews in the future
period, while 73.57% received bad reviews in previous period. For all
the items that received bad reviews in the current period, 78% will
receive good reviews in the future period, while 63.77% received good
reviews in the previous period; For those items included in the good
news group, on average their mean consumer rating increases by 0.51
as we move forward from t−1 to t (current period), on average their
mean consumer rating decreased by 0.29 in the previous period and
will decrease by 0.27 in the future period again. We also observe
similar pattern for the items included in the bad news group. For such
items, on average, mean consumer rating decreases by 0.52 from t−1
to t (current period), however their mean consumer rating on average
increased by 0.11 in the previous period (from t−2 to t−1), and will
increase by 0.22 in the future period again (from t to t+1).
In general, Fig. 2 reveals that online reviews demonstrate a mean-
reverse property. That is given a decrease of consumer ratings of a
product in the current period, there will, generally, be an increase in
consumer ratings in the future period and vice versa. One possible
explanation for such reverse property of online reviews is the existence
of review manipulation. Online publishers, book authors, and vendors
are continuously monitoring online reviews, and these entities will
write strong positive reviews to boost the online consumer ratings
whenever there is a decrease in consumer ratings.7 However, future
reviews written by new consumers will correct that manipulation and
reverse the direction of the reviews.
In the Amazonmarket, there are other factors that might influence
the changes in the reviews, such as the popularity of an item. To tease
out the potential confounding influence of the popularity of a product,
we classify our items into 10 equally spaced groups based on product
sales ranks and repeat the same analysis. Our results show that even
after controlling popularity, online consumer reviews still demon-
strate a mean-reverse property.
Another potential reason for this mean-reverse property is the
limitation in the review scores that consumers can give. Recall that at
Count 0
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Fig. 2. Mean-reverse property of online reviews.
6 Again, for simplicity, we exclude those cases when review scores do not change.
Our results stay the same regardless of whether we include or exclude no-change
cases.
7 Experienced products, such as books, might not be perfect substitutes for each
other. Hence, we believe it is more feasible for a vendor to post strong positive reviews
for his own products instead of posting negative reviews for his competitors.
617N. Hu et al. / Decision Support Systems 50 (2011) 614–626
Amazon, consumers can report only an integer product review score
with a 1-star to 5-star Liker-type scale. In such a case, because later
consumers cannot leave ratings of less than 1 or larger than 5, for
items whose average rating is 1 (5) in the current period, their
average ratings will definitely increase (decrease) in the future period
and result in a mean-reverse phenomena even without publishers/
authors/vendors' manipulation. We deleted those events where the
mean of the consumer rating at the current period was 1 or 5 and
repeated the same data analysis, for which we ended up with the
same conclusion.
In addition, for the cross-sectional data, Fig. 3 shows that out of all
the ratings that products receive (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 in Amazon), only the
percentage of “5” ratings decreases over time. The percentages of all of
the other ratings increase in the very same manner and the relative
magnitudes among the percentages of “1,” “2,” “3,” and “4” ratings
stay the same. One possible explanation of the large percentage of “5”
ratings at the early stages of a product's release is manipulation. As
time moves on, vendors are less likely to be involved in manipulation
due to the increasing manipulation costs, thus the percentage of “5”
ratings decreases over time.
Having said that, we understand that instead of being an indication
of manipulation, another potential explanation for what we observed
(Fig. 2) might be that online reviews follow a slow convergence
process (self-selection) toward their associated true product quality.
Hence, in our next section, we seek to uncover the real underlying
driver.
3. Theoretical analyses: A pure self-selection process or a
combination of self-selection with manipulation?
We now know that there are two potential drivers that might
explain why reviews of most products tend to fall over time (Table 2).
Our next question is whether a pure self-selection process without
manipulation can be the sole underlying driving force. If a pure self-
selection process is not the sole driver, then we are faced with a
situation where self-selection and manipulation exist simultaneously.
As we can see in Table 2, while manipulation might increase or
decrease over time, so does self-selection. “High to low” (low to high)
self-selection means that customers who have higher (lower)
valuation of an item come in early (later), resulting in a positive
(negative) but decreasing (increasing) bias over time. And the
majority of consumer reviews of early periods are systematically
positively biased [9]. As elaborated in Section 2, the likelihood of
publishers, authors, or vendors coming in and manipulating the
reviews decreases over time as well. Putting these together, Zone 1 in
Table 2 is the most likely situation. Note that we do not assume that
manipulation or self-selection of every item have a decreasing trend
over time. Our results still hold as long as the majority of the items
follow a decreasing trend. From now on, we focus our research for
Zone 1.
To test whether self-selection alone is sufficient to drive the
temporal effect we observe, out of our cross-sectional sample, we
select those books, DVDs, and videos that have at least 100 reviews.
We then divide the reviews of each item into two subgroups. Group 1
includes all the reviews collected right after an item was released to
the Amazon market (the first 25 reviews, excluding the first 5
reviews). The first 5 reviews are excluded because these reviews
might be either randomly generated reviews or highly manipulated
reviews. Please note that excluding the first 5 is a more conservative
test of review manipulation, and even with these reviews included,
qualitatively our results do not change. Group 2 includes, for the
same group of items, the 81st review to the 100th review an item
received. So group 1 represents the period in which higher manip-
ulation or higher self-selection bias is more likely to occur. Group 2
represents the time period when the rating bias or manipulation bias
is much less likely (near zero). Comparing the behavior of these two
groups will enable us to identify the underlying drivers of the
temporal effect.
3.1. Themodel: A pure self-selection processwith “higher rating” consumers
entering first
For this model, the underlying driving force is self-selection with
“higher rating” consumers coming in first. “Higher rating” consumers
refer to early adopters who are more enthusiastic about a product and
who are more likely to leave positive reviews. In such a case, at time t,
there will be a systematic self-selection positive bias hit incorporated
within the online reviews ritwith respect to the true product quality qi
for product i (Eq. (3)).
rit = qi + hit + εit ð3Þ
For the majority of the products, we assume that hit is positive but
decreases over time. εit∼N(0,σit2) represents the difference between
the online rating and a product's true quality. Thus, the average rating
of K products at the same time (order) t is
rt =
1
K
∑
K
i=1
rit =
1
K
∑
K
i=1
qi + hit + εtð Þ = q + ht + εt ð4Þ
q is the average quality of all the K products in our sample. Because the
majority of hit is positive but decreasing over time (positive bias
introduced by early adopters), thus ht decreases over time (resulting
in Fig. 1). As time goes on (when t→∞, hit→0 and ht→0, thus ri→qi
and h→q), there will be no rating bias and online reviews will
converge to products' true quality.
Define Ri= t = 1t ∑
t
j=1
rij as the average consumer rating item i
received at the time period t, then
Ri j t−1 =
1
t−1 ∑
t−1
j=1
qi + hit + εið Þ = qi + hi j t−1 + ε′i: ð5Þ
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Fig. 3. Percentage of ratings over time.
Table 2
Driving force for online reviews over time.
Self-
selection
Manipulation
High→Low Low→High
High→Low Zone 1 Zone 2
Low→High Zone 3 Zone 4
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Taking Eq. (5) to Eq. (3), we can get the equation
rit = hit−hi j t−1
 
+ Ri j t−1 + ε
″
: ð6Þ
We assume that: 1) the higher-taste-self-selection bias decreases
with a convex function over time; 2) self-selection is independent of
quality; 3) quality is larger than the self-selection bias, namely
quality NN ht−hi j t−1). With the above assumptions, the difference
between ht and hi j t−1 ht−hi j t−1
 
is smaller than zero for both the
first group and the second group. However, that difference is bigger
for the second group than for the first group. Furthermore, the slopes
of both groups should be the same (Fig. 4).
Proposition 1. If the underlying driver is self-selection bias (higher
rating first), for the linear relation between the ratings of the current
period and the average ratings of the previous period, group 1 and group
2 have the same slope (which equals 1: perfect positive linear
correlation), but different intercepts. The intercept of group 2 is bigger
than the intercept of group 1, but both are negative.
3.2. The model: Pure manipulation (with decreasing likelihood of
manipulation over time)
The goal of manipulation behavior is to boost a product's online
reviews in order to influence consumers' purchase decisions.We assume
that a product will receive a review from an actual customer 1−ρt
percent of time (assuming consumers know the true quality of the
product of consumption and always truthfully report their evaluations
when they write reviews). ρt percent of time, that product will receive a
manipulated review. Whenever vendors decide whether they should
engage on online review manipulation, they need do a cost–benefit
analysis. Since as time progresses products will receive an increasing
number of authentic online consumer reviews, it becomesmore difficult
and costly to manipulate consumer opinions, thus we believe that ρt
decreaseswith elapsed time. Ri t−1j j is the average consumer rating item i
received at the time period t−1, while π A−Ri j t−1
  captures the
incentive of the manipulation. π is a standardized parameter, and A
reflects who is more likely to engage in manipulation.
Recall that on Amazon.com, 1-star = least satisfied and 5-star =
most satisfied. Depending on the average rating a product received in
the previous period, a vendor selling that product can decide whether
to engage in manipulation at that time. For simplicity, we assume that
for a firm deciding to adopt manipulation techniques, the actual
manipulation strategy either monotonically increases or decreases
with respect to the average rating a product received in the previous
period, which is π A−Ri j t−1
 . A=5 (A=1) represents the scenario
where firms selling products with lower (higher) average consumer
ratings are more likely to practice manipulation. We will find out
which kind of manipulation happens on Amazon in the next section.
rit = Ri j t−1 + π
qi + ε
c
i
A−Ri j t−1
  + εmi
Pc = 1−ρtð Þ
Pm = ρtð Þ
(
ð7Þ8
(Note εci∼N 0;σ2c
 
; εmi ∼N 0;σ2m
 
, and c represents consumer andm
represents manipulation).
So at any time (order) t, the expectation of rit is E ritð Þ = 1−ρtð Þqi +
ρtRi j t−1 + ρtπ A−Ri j t−1
 . Since the expectation and variance of rit are
finite, for a group of items including K number of products, based on the
law of large numbers, the difference between the average ratings and
expected ratings is finite
1
K
∑
K
i=1
rit−
1
K
∑
K
i=1
E ritð Þ∼N 0;σ2t
 
: ð8Þ
Thus, the average ratings of these groups of items at the same time
(order) t is
r t =
1
K
∑
K
i=1
E ritð Þ + εt =
1
K
∑
K
i=1
qi + ρtRi j t−1−ρtqi + ρtπ A−Ri j t−1
 h i
+ εt = q +
ρt
K
∑
K
i=1
Ri j t−1−qi
 
+
ρtπ
K
∑
K
i=1
A−Ri j t−1
 
+ εtrt = q + ωρt + εt
ð9Þ
where,
ω =
ρt
K
∑
K
i=1
Ri j t−1−qi
 
+
ρtπ
K
∑
K
i=1
A−Ri j t−1
  N 0 ð10Þ
ω is a finite positive number. And as t→∞,ρt→0, thus, as time moves
on, the average rating of the tth reviews over all K items is also
decreasing over time, resulting in Fig. 1 as well
• If the products with higher average ratings are more likely to
be manipulated (A is 1), then.
E ritð Þ = 1−ρtð Þqi + ρtRi j t−1 + ρtπ Ri j t−1−1
 
= −ρtπ + 1−ρtð Þ qi−Ri j t−1
 
+ 1 + ρtπð ÞRi j t−1
qi−Ri t−1 should be related to ρt; the larger the ρt, the bigger the
difference between its quality and its average rating. Thus,
E ritð Þ = −ρtπ−θρt 1−ρtð Þ + 1 + ρtπð ÞRi j t−1 = λ1ρt + 1 + ρtπð Þ
Ri j t−1 where θN0 and λ1=−ρtπ−θρt(1−ρt)b0. So for the first
group, because ρtN0,λ1ρtb0 (intercept) and 1+ρtπN1 (slope);
while for the second group, because ρt→0,λ1ρt→0 (intercept) and
1+ρtπ→1 (slope).
• If the products with lower average ratings are more likely to be
manipulated (A is 5), proceeding along lines similar to the above, we
obtain the following expression: E rit = λ2ρt + 1−ρtπð ÞRi j t−1

.
Under such a circumstance, for the first group, λ2ρtN0 (intercept)
and 1−ρtπb1 (slope); while for the second group, because
ρt→0,λ2ρt→0 (intercept) and 1−ρtπ→1 (slope).
Combining the above cases, one can draw the conclusion that
when the underlying driver is manipulation, the plot of the current
group 1 
group 2 
0
t th hΔ − Δ
itr
1| −
Ri |t–1
Fig. 4. Predicted relation between ratings and average rating based on positive rating
bias assumption.
8 This is a strategy that is more feasible for vendors to implement because for
experienced goods, quality is non-verifiable before the goods are consumed. This
means vendors should manipulate based on the market signal (reviews) both they and
consumers can observe. Later, we investigate the ways in which vendors consider both
quality and reviews to make manipulation decisions.
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rating against its previous average rating for groups 1 and 2 is
different for both slope and intercept (demonstrated in Fig. 5).
Proposition 2. If the underlying driver is manipulation, assuming that
manipulation decreases over time, for the linear relation between the
ratings of current period and the average ratings of previous period, group
1 and group 2 have different slopes (the slope of group 2 is close to 1) and
different intercepts (the intercept of group 2 is close to 0). In addition, if
products with higher (lower) average ratings are more likely to be
manipulated, then the slope of group 1 is bigger (smaller) than 1 and the
intercept of group 1 is smaller (bigger) than 0.
3.3. If there is no “positive rating bias driven by self-selection bias” and
no “manipulation”
When there is no “self-selection” or “manipulation” involved, we
can obtain:
Ri j t−1 =
1
t−1 ∑
t−1
j=1
rij =
1
t−1 ∑
t−1
j=1
qi + εið Þ = qi + ε′i: ð11Þ
Further, taking Eq. (11) and substituting it into Eq. (1), we have
rit = Ri j t−1 + ε
″
: ð12Þ
Under such an assumption, both the first group and the second
group have the same intercept and slope.
3.4. The empirical test and robustness check
We regressed the rating on the lag average rating for reviews of
group 1 (orders 6–25) and group 2 (orders 81–100) separately. Due to
the nature of this sample, we expect that manipulation is more likely
for the first group. Because we include reviews of various products
over time, we must control the heterogeneity of age, popularity, or
reviewer characteristics over time and across different product items.
However, we cannot control such heterogeneity by running a fixed
effect model at individual item level because doing so for group 1 and
group 2 will definitely result in different slope and intercept
estimations for these two groups. Auto regression with trend will
perturb our result. Thus, in order to get the right estimation, we
control the following potential confounding factors:
• Age and time effect
Each group includes productswith agedifferences (age refers tohow
long a product has been released to the Amazon market), and for
each product, it includes reviews belonging to 20 orders. Thus, the
self-selection pattern might vary over different products with
different time. To control for the age and time effect, we add two
variables, namely Lag(log(T)) and DifT. Lag(log(T)) is used to control
the age of the review at the previous period. For a particular review
written for one specific item, it is estimated as the date difference
between the previous review date and the date that item was
released to the Amazonmarket.DifT is used to control the number of
days difference between the current review and its nearest previous
review. To summarize, Lag(log(T)) is used to control the self-
selection time characteristics at time T−1, while DifT is used to
control the self-selection time characteristics of the current rating.
• Silence
For each item, we construct one variable termed “Silence”
(Silence=T /# of Reviews) to control for product popular effect.
Silence represents the mean inter-arrival time between two
adjacent reviews. A smaller Silence value represents an item with
higher popularity.
• Reviewer quality change over time
The role of reviewers also influences how consumers act upon
online reviews. If one product received a higher percentage of
expert reviews, then generally its reviews will be more useful with
less “self-selection” (Because the experts understand more about
the quality of the product, their reviews will have less bias). How
to distinguish which reviews are more professional? For every
review posted on Amazon.com, it provides the data about how
many other customers read that review (totalvotes) and howmany
think that review is helpful (helpfulvotes). Thus we define a
variable called Helpration (Helpration=# of helpfulvotes /# of
totalvotes). For each item and at time T, we estimate the mean of
the Helpful ratio of all reviews received at time T−1 for that item,
termed Lag(AvgHelpratio), to control the change of review quality
over time. Lastly, we add the DVDdummy and the Vhsdummy to
control the product category. The final model is as follows
Rating = β0 + β1Lag Avgratingð Þ + β2Lag Log Tð Þð Þ + β3Lagdif T
+ β4Lag Popularityð Þ + β5Lag Avghelpratioð Þ
+ β6Dvddummy + β7Vhsdummy + ε
Model 1
Based on what the real underlying driver is, manipulation or self-
selection, we expect to see the following results in Table 3. By testing
whether β1 of group 1 equals to that of group 2, we can uncoverwhich
is the real driver, self-selection or manipulation.
Furthermore, we conduct a White test to check the existence of
heteroscedasticity and cannot accept the homoscedasticity at the 5%
level. Based on the procedure proposed in Long and Ervin [10], we run
a SAS macro to correct the potential heteroscedasticity problem.
Qualitatively the results didn't change.
Table 4 presents the regression results for these two groups. The
intercept of group 1 (Para=1.16, p-valueb0.0001) is much bigger
than that of group 2 (Para=0.14, p-valueb0.63). The slope of group 1
(Para=0.71, p-valueb0.0001) is also different from that of group 2
(Para=0.96, p-valueb0.0001). In addition, the slope of group 1 (0.71)
is significantly smaller than 1, while the slope of group 2 (0.96) is not
significantly different from 1. If the underlying process for the
majority of the items is self-selection (AR with trend), then we
itr
group 1
(A=5)
group 2
group 1
(A=1)
Ri |t–1
Fig. 5. Predicted relation between ratings and average rating based on manipulation
assumption.
Table 3
Expected regression results with different divers.
Drivers Group 1 Group 2
Higher average rating→higher manipulation Intercept b0 =0
Slope N1 =1
Lower average rating→higher manipulation Intercept N0 =0
Slope b1 =1
Self-selection bias (positive rating bias) Intercept b0 b0
Slope 1 1
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should expect the slope of group 1 to be exactly the same as that of
group 2 (see Table 3). However, this is not what we observe in Table 4.
Combining the above results, we believe that a pure “Self-Selection
bias” cannot lead to the phenomena we observe. We conclude that
these results reveal the existence of positive manipulation behavior,
and prove that products with a lower average rating are more likely to
be manipulated. At the same time, it is worth noting that the “Self-
Selection bias” proposed by [9] cannot totally be ruled out. At the very
least, we prove that manipulation must be present in order to drive
such phenomena. This might indicate that what we observed is the
result of joint forces: manipulation and self-selection. For robustness
check, we also consider 3 other cases, such as running regression
using cross-sectional data. Overall we still observe the existence of
manipulation. Please refer to Appendix A for details.
4. Relation between quality and manipulation9
In Section 3, we studied the relation between average rating and
manipulation, and documented that reviews of products with low
average ratings would be more likely to be manipulated. In this section,
we investigate the relation between product quality and manipulation
because the average rating of a product is not necessarily the same as its
product quality, especially for the early stage reviews. Thereforewe seek
to answer the followingquestion:what kind of products ismore likely to
be manipulated, low-quality products (with lower average ratings) or
high-quality products (with lower average ratings)? Or do low- and
high-quality products share an equal chance to be manipulated?
Dellarocas [2] pointed out that online reviews are more informative if
every firm's manipulation strategy is a monotonically increasing
function with respect to that vendor's true quality. However is this the
strategy that every manipulator really adopted?
In order to find the answer to the above question, we study the
variance of the quality w.r.t. average consumer rating at orders 7, 27
and 87, where we expect to see high, low, and nearly no manipulation
occurring in these three periods respectively. Also, as the time (order)
elapses, the uncertainty of the consumer reviews will also go down
and converge to the products' true quality.
If there is no manipulation (Fig. 6A), then, the variance of the
quality with respect to the average rating should be very close to 0.
If every vendor has an equal chance to engage in manipulation and
the vendors' manipulation strategy is fully systematic (see Fig. 6B),
the variance of the quality with respect to the average rating should
remain constant. Meanwhile, for any given average rating, with the
elapsed time, the variance of quality with respect to that average
rating will decline (The light gray area will become narrow).
However, some firms might decide not to be involved in manipula-
tion from day 1 because they care more about their own reputations, or
they have limited resources that prevent them from engaging in such
activities, or the product in question is not one of the mainstream
products of that vendor. Thus, at the same time (order), even for
different vendors selling the same quality of products, the probability of
manipulation ρt may be different. We assume that ρit is uniformly
distributedbetween0andmaxρit. If different vendors sellingproducts of
the same level of quality indeed adopt differentmanipulation strategies,
quantified by different ρit, then for products receiving the same average
rating at the same order t, their quality will be different. The variance of
the quality w.r.t average rating will be significantly greater than 0 (see
Fig. 6C and D). The dark gray area represents the manipulation zone,
while the light gray area represents the noise. Moreover, as time (order)
goes by, ρt→0, no matter whether the manipulation strategies are the
same amongdifferent vendors, therewill be nomanipulation at the end.
The variances of qualityw.r.t to average ratings should be converged to 0
(see Fig. 6A3, B3, C3, and D3).
Given that the existence of manipulation has been proven in
Section 3, within the same period (order 7 and order 27),10 we
develop the following hypotheses:
H1a. If reviews of lower quality products (with lower average ratings)
are more likely to be manipulated, within the same period when the
average rating increases, the variances of quality will at least
demonstrate a decreasing trend.11 In addition, across different periods,
that variance will converge to zero with elapsed time (see Fig. 6D1–2).
H1b. If reviews of higher quality products (with lower average
ratings) are more likely to be manipulated, within the same period
when the average rating increases, the variances of quality should not
decrease. Furthermore, across different periods that variance will
converge to zero with elapsed time (see Fig. 6E1–2).
To test our Hypotheses 1a and 1b, out of our cross-sectional sample,
we still select those books, DVDs, and videos that have at least 100
reviews.12 For these items, the average consumer rating at order 100 is
chosen to be a measurement of a product's true quality.13 We also try
other ways to define quality, such as the method used in Section 5.
Qualitatively the results do not change. For each item, we calculate its
average rating at time (order) t followed by an estimation of the
variances of the quality. In order to avoid the potential issue caused by
the rating bound,14 we focus on studying only the average rating
between 1.5 and 4.5. Fig. 7 shows that as the average rating goes up, the
variances of quality go down (order 7 and order 27). As time elapses, the
Table 4
The relation between ratings and lag average rating.
Variable Group 1 Group 2
Intercept 1.16***
(38.69)
0.14
(0.63)
Lagavgrating 0.71***
(139.62)
0.96***
(157.84)
Laglogt −0.03***
(−3.78)
−0.02
(−0.47)
Logdift 0.02***
(6.72)
0.01***
(4.86)
Logpopularity 0.04***
(5.34)
0.03
(0.56)
Lagavghelpratio −15.11*
(−1.66)
−1.60
(−0.91)
Dvddummy 0.01
(1.25)
0.01
(0.87)
Vhsdummy −0.02***
(−2.63)
0.01
(1.01)
N 130,400 130,400
Adj R square 0.15 0.17
*** P≤0.01, * P≤0.1.
9 Here “higher quality vendors” actually means vendors selling products with a
higher quality.
10 At order 87, there is almost no manipulation.
11 Technically speaking, we should see an increasing trend followed by a decreasing
trend. However, depending on the manipulation level and the data, the increasing
trend part might not be observable.
12 The number of 100 reviews was chosen to ensure the items have been in Amazon
long enough to go through the high manipulation (self-selection) stage to low
manipulation (self-selection) stage. At this time (order 100), the average rating is a
good proxy for the product's true quality.
13 The slopes of group 2 for Table 4 and Table 5 are not significantly different from 1,
indicating that at this time, the average rating already converges to the product's true
quality. Furthermore, changing this to order 90, 110, etc. qualitatively does not change
our final results.
14 Because of this boundary, we might not be able to observe the variance goes up
portions.
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variances of quality decrease as well. And, at order 87 that variance is
almost 0 (supporting our Hypothesis 1a). In general, our empirical
results show that even vendors that sell products of the same quality
adopt differentmanipulation strategies, and it ismore likely for a vendor
selling the lower quality products and receiving low average consumer
ratings to engage in manipulation. This type of manipulation indeed
makes things even worse because under such a circumstance, online
reviews are much less informative.
5. Are consumers able to fully account for bias?
Our previous analyses suggest that there is systematic manipulation
of online consumer opinions, but not every vendor engages in
manipulation. Even vendors that sell products of the same quality
adopt different manipulation strategies. As the manipulation strategy is
not fully systematic, the higher quality products may show lower
average ratings. In contrast, the lower quality products may exhibit
higher average ratings (Fig. 8). Hence, there is a disconnection between
quality and average rating. Under such a circumstance, we hypothesize
that consumers might not be able to fully correct for this bias when
making purchase decisions because they cannot tell which vendors are
or are not manipulating online reviews. The best they can do to correct
for this bias is based on an expected overall market manipulation.
We use a panel dataset instead of a cross-sectional dataset to study
whether consumers fully account for the self-selection bias and
manipulation. The reason for using a panel dataset is that in order to
test this hypothesis, for each item we need to know its sales, review,
and price information for the period when this item has high chance
of being manipulated. In addition, for the same item, we also need to
know such information for the period when there is almost no
manipulation, such as its true quality.
Before we present our hypotheses, let's first introduce three key
constructs. In order to test whether consumers fully correct the bias,
out of the panel data sample, for each batch of data, we select those
items whose total numbers of reviews at that batch level is less than
25. The number 25 was selected to ensure that serious manipulation
or self-selection was more likely to be occurring and that the average
ratings at that time did not reflect a product's true quality. We then
collected the consumer reviews for these products again in January
2008. Those items whose numbers of reviews in January 2008 were
still fewer than 65 were deleted from our sample to make sure that
the items had received enough reviews and that their average ratings
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at this point (2008) represented the true product quality.15 The
average rating collected in 2005 is called rori; the one collected at 2008
is named rq (approximated as the true product quality).
Because different vendors adopt different manipulation strategies,
we expect that consumers might not be able to fully correct for the
bias caused by vendors' manipulation strategies. The best consumers
can do is to estimate the quality based on the expected overall
manipulation level. So we can derive the rating consumers used to
make a purchase decision (termed radj) based on Model 2:
AvgRating−Quality = β0 + β1 5−Qualityð Þ + β2Lag log T
+ Lagdif T + β4LagAvghelpratio + β5Dvddummy
+ β6Vhsdummy + ε: Model 2
The difference between the actual quality (the future average
rating collected in 2008) and the historical average rating (collected in
2005) represents the quality bias either due to manipulation or self-
selection. So, now the original average rating a product received can
be broken into three components:
rorigi = r
adj
i + r
q
i −r
adj
i
 
+ rorii −r
q
i
 
• radji represents consumers' estimated product quality according to
their expectation of the overall manipulation and self-selection.
Where
r adji =
1
1− β̂1
ðAvgRating− β̂0−5 β̂1− β̂2Lag log T
− β̂3Lagdif T− β̂4LagAvghelpratio− β̂5Dvddummy
− β̂6Vhsdummy
• rorii −r
q
i measures the bias introduced by the manipulation and self-
selection effects included in the original average rating.
• rqi −r
adj
i has two possible interpretations. When r
q
i −r
adj
i is greater
(less) than zero, it represents the situation for a given item i: either
consumers over-adjust (under-adjust) or vendors are more (less)
honest and the manipulation level of that vendor is relatively
smaller (bigger) than the overall market level manipulation.
H2a. If customers are able to fully correct for the bias, the sales of a
product should be positively correlated with its true quality,
approximated by its future average rating (rqi ). And the sales of a
product should not be correlated with rorii −r
q
i .
H2b. If customers can only partially correct such a bias, the sales of a
product should be positively correlated with rorii , r
adj
i and r
ori
i −r
q
i . And
the sales of a product should not be correlated with rqi −r
adj
i .
H2c. If customers can only partially correct such a bias, the sales of a
product should be positively correlated with rorii , r
adj
i and r
ori
i −r
q
i .
We use the following three empirical models to validate our
hypotheses and present the results in Table 5.
InðSalesRanki + 1Þ = β11r qi + β21 log SalesRankið Þ + β31 log priceið Þ
+ β41 log NumXrevið Þ + β51DVDXDummy
+ β61VHSXDummy + εi1 Model 3a
InðSalesRanki + 1Þ = β12 r orii + β22 log SalesRankið Þ + β32 log priceið Þ
+ β42 log NumXrevið Þ + β52DVDXDummy
+ β62VHSXDummy + εi2 Model 3b
In SalesRanki + 1
 
= β13r
adj
i + β23 r
q
i −r
orig
i
 
+ β33 log SalesRankið Þ
+ β43 log priceið Þ + β53 log NumXrevið Þ
+ β63DVDXDummy + β73VHSXDummy + εi3:
Model 3c
Recall that SalesRank is the opposite of sales. Model 3a of Table 5
shows that the future average rating (proxy for quality) is insignif-
icantly (Para=−0.06, p-value=0.1125) negatively associated with
the historical sales rank, while rori (Model 3b) is significant (Para=
−0.13, p-valueb0.0001). This indicates that consumers are not able to
fully account for the bias caused by self-selection and manipulation.
Model 3c of Table 5 shows that both the consumer adjusted quality
radji (Para=−0.20, p-valueb0.05) and the manipulation and self-
selection bias rorii −r
q
i (Para=−0.68, p-valueb0.005) are significantly
negatively associated with the historical sales rank, while the
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15 To cross-validate whether the method we proposed is correct, we compare the
predictive power of average ratings to sales by linking the historical average rating
(collected in 2005) and future average rating (collected in 2008) to the sales in 2005
for those items that received at least 65 reviews (in 2005) respectively. The number 65
was selected to test whether the average rating of items with 65+ reviews is a good
indication of a product's true quality. The historical rating and future rating
demonstrate the same magnitude and significance in terms of predicting historical
sales of 2005. Furthermore, when we run our regression (Model 1) using order 65 and
66, the coefficient of the LagAvgrating is 0.95 and is not significantly different from 1.
The other control variables are not significant. So basically there is no “Manipulation”
and “Self-selection” after order 65. In addition, we also tried other cutting points, such
as 75, 85, 90, and 100, and got very similar results.
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coefficient before the quality minus adjusted rating variable is not
significant (p-valueN0.10), indicating that even though consumers
are able to adjust for the manipulation bias and self-selection bias,
they can adjust for it only partially. Vendors are able to cheat
consumers by manipulating the final outcomes.
6. How do customers make purchase decisions when
manipulation exists?
In the above sections, we show that, to some degree, online reviews
are not trustworthy. Under such a circumstance, what information do
consumers use tomake purchase decisions? For experienced goods sold
through the online electronic marketplace, in the absence of review
manipulation, consumer reviews can be considered as a superior quality
signal because these online reviews providing information about an
item's value are written by previous customers after consumption.
However, at the early stage with the presence of review manipulation,
thestory is different. Reviewsof this stage areno longer fully trustworthy
andmightbedowngraded to an “inferior”quality proxy.Whennot every
vendor manipulates online reviews and consumers cannot discern who
is andwho is notmanipulating, a higher pricemight lead to an increasing
insteadof a decreasingdemandbecause ahigherpricemight emerge as a
quality index.16 This is consistent with previous literature that vendors
can use price or advertisement to signal their products' quality.
In order to test the existence of the “price quality” indicator in
Amazon, we run separate regressions using four different sub-
samples out of our panel data. For each sub-sample and each batch
of data, we select those items whose total numbers of reviews at that
batch level are greater than 100, between 55 and 65, between 25 and
15, and between 5 and 15 respectively. As stated before, as time
progresses, the manipulation will decrease. So we expect that the
probability of manipulation will be larger for the sub-sample
composed of items with early stage reviews than for the sub-sample
composed of items with later stage reviews. At the same time, prices
will change from being positively associated with sales (at the early
stage, reviews are manipulated so that price becomes a better quality
signal) to being negatively associated with sales. At that later stage,
the manipulation will be almost zero. Price becomes dis-utility
because for two products with the same quality, signaled by the
same average rating, consumers will select the one with the lower
price because to consumer that product has a higher net utility.
H3. The price and the product sales will move in the same way when
the manipulation is present; in the absence of manipulation, an
increase in price will lead to a decrease in sales.
Table 6 shows that at the beginning, price is significantly (Para=
−0.06, p-valueb0.05) negatively associated with the future sales rank
(proxy for the inverse of sales). This indicates that consumers use price
as a quality signal because online reviews are less trustworthy when
manipulation is present. The higher the price, the larger the sales will be
(the lower the sales rank). As time progresses, the relationship changed
to be negative and statistically insignificant, positive and statistically
insignificant andfinally positive and statistically significant (Para=0.06,
p-valueb0.05). This supports our Hypothesis 3.
7. Manipulation across websites
Readers might think that our results are driven by special features
of the data from Amazon. To check the robustness of our results, we
collected 190,135 reviews for about 5149 items from Barnes & Noble
in January 2008 and repeated the same analysis as in Section 3.
Qualitatively, we arrived at similar results and found consistent
manipulation of product reviews on Barnes & Noble as well.
Further, we estimated the overall manipulation levels at Barnes
Noble and Amazon over time and plotted the results in Fig. 9. For each
order (time), we run the regression based on Model 2 to get an
estimation of β1, which is used to approximate themanipulation index,
representing the overallmanipulation level. Our estimates show that on
average, the manipulation levels decrease over time on both Barnes &
Noble and Amazon. However, Barnes & Noble shows a higher level of
manipulation.Our interpretation for suchanobservation is that Amazon
has a greater wealth of consumer reviews and better reviewer qualities.
Table 5
Regression analysis result of whether consumers are able to fully account for
manipulation bias (dependent variable: ln(SalesRank)).
Parameter Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c
Intercept 0.78*** 1.22*** 1.67***
Quality −0.06
Original rating −0.13***
Adjusted rating 0.20***
Quality—adjusted rating −0.58
Original rating—quality −0.68**
Lag log (sales rank) 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.92***
Lag log (price) −0.001 −0.01 −0.02
Lag log (no. reviews) 0.02 0.004 −0.01
DVDdummy −0.06 −0.06 −0.06
Vhsdummy 0.01 −0.03 0.02
N 1245 1245 1245
R square 0.86 0.87 0.87
*** P≤0.01, ** P≤0.05.
Table 6
Regression analysis result of the “price quality” indicator (dependent variable: ln
(SalesRank)).
Parameter Sample group
N100 [55,65] [15,25] [5,15]
Manipulation probability Low High
Intercept 0.71*** 1.65*** 0.94*** 1.43***
Average rating −0.12*** −0.1*** −0.03* −0.1***
Lag log (sales rank) 0.87*** 0.9*** 0.9*** 0.9***
Lag log (price) 0.06** 0.01 −0.01 −0.06**
Lag log (no. reviews) 0.13 −0.05 0.05 −0.01
DVDdummy −0.02 −0.18 −0.10 −0.09
Vhsdummy 0.08 −0.04 −0.02 0.03
N 2339 7810 3105 1805
0.81 0.81 0.86 0.84 0.84
*** P≤0.01, ** P≤0.05, * P≤0.1.
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Fig. 9. Manipulation at different times for Barnes & Noble vs. Amazon.17
16 Here we assume that vendors know the true quality of a product and will charge
the optimal price to maximize their profits.
17 For Amazon, we select those items with more than 100 reviews from our cross-
sectional data. The average rating we retrieve at that time represents the true quality
of those items. On Barnes & Noble, due to data limitations, the cut-off point is 65. We
also use 65 reviews as a cut-off point for Amazon and arrive at similar results.
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For example, Amazon has formed online clubs called “Purchase Circles”
for people with similar interests in which reviewers and customers can
build connectionswith each other through chat, discussion, and debate.
Our results are not driven by the sampling issue because only 536 books
fit our sample selection criteria (see Fig. 2 legend)whenwe estimate the
manipulation level for Barnes & Noble, while 1526 books fit the criteria
for Amazon. To make sure that the results are not driven by sample
selection bias, we randomly selected 536 items out of the 1526 Amazon
books and repeated the same analysis. Quantitatively and qualitatively,
the results do not change.
Please note that the decreasing trend captured by Fig. 9 might be
caused by the joint forces of manipulation and self-selection bias. It is
reasonable to assume that the self-selection bias on Amazon is similar to
that onBarnes&Noblebecause it is very unlikely that these twowebsites
serve two groups of customers with completely different tastes over
time. Thus, evenwith self-selection bias,we can still draw the conclusion
that manipulation is a more serious problem on Barnes & Noble than on
Amazon.
8. Discussions, conclusions, and future researches
In this study, we use data from Amazon and Barnes & Noble to
document that publishers, authors, and vendors consistently manipulate
online consumer reviews. If a firm decides to adopt manipulation, its
manipulation strategy is monotonically decreasing with respect to that
product's truequality. Under sucha case,manipulation actually decreases
the informativeness of online reviews. However, we prove that not all
firms will manipulate online reviews. Because of this non-systematic
involvement, it is not easy for consumers to fully correct formanipulation
bias. Consumers can adjust for that bias based only on their expectations
about overall manipulation rates. To some degree, vendors are able to
manipulate the outcomes of the results and consumers therefore respond
to the wrong information. We document the existence of the “price
quality proxy” in the sense that at the early stage after an item is released
to the Amazonmarket, consumers use price as a quality indicator instead
of using the average rating. Thus, a higher price leads to an increase rather
than a decrease in sales. Finally, we show that generally there is a higher
level of manipulation on Barnes & Noble than on Amazon.
We document that the lower the quality and average rating of the
products a vendor is selling, the higher the likelihood that that vendor
is going to conduct online manipulation. This makes online reviews
much less informative than when either there is no manipulation or
when vendors selling higher quality products are more likely to
manipulate online consumer opinions. This might result in consu-
mers' totally discarding online reviews, defying the purpose of
vendors' building online review systems and providing customers
with an online review option. Over the long run, online markets such
as Amazon.com or Barnes & Noble.com cannot maintain the quality of
their online consumer opinion information when such manipulation
is taking place. If the market continues to evolve in this way,
customers will no longer read these online reviews. We urge the key
players in these online markets to find a way to increase the cost of
manipulation in order to mitigate the manipulation effect. We call for
collective thinking within this community, including the technical
vendors and business entities, to build a better online system to fight
against this practice. The ideal situation would be that online reviews
represent the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth about
their products. However, unless we can resolve the manipulation
issue, online consumers can only get the “partial truth.”
Appendix A. Additional tests for validating the existence of online
reviews manipulation
A.1. Robustness check: Case I
What we did in Table 4 was to regress the current rating on the lag
average rating with time-series dimension (for each item, we include
20 reviews from different times). For robustness checking purposes,
out of group 1 and group 2, we chose 20 cross-sectional datasets
(cross-sectional datasets means including only the reviews of the
same order) and run separate regressions at each order level. We
excluded the “Silence” variable because there is no information
difference to the variable “Silence”when all reviews are from the same
order. Results are presented in Table A1. The coefficients of the
intercept of group 1 are consistently significantly greater than zero
while the coefficients of the LagAvegrating are consistently signifi-
cantly less than 1 for various orders (orders 6 to 24th). However, for
group 2, from order 80 to order 98, their intercepts are zero; while
their coefficients of Lag(Avgrating) are not different from 1 (based on
F-test). All the results show that manipulation does exist.
A.2. Robustness check: Case II
The results in Table 4 might be problematic if the error term is not
constant over time. Hu et al. [7] have shown that ratings are more
likely to follow U-shaped distributions because consumers are more
likely to write reviews when they are very satisfied or dissatisfied.
Hence, the error term might not be normal. If as time progresses,
customers are more likely to moan, then it might lead to the self-
selection documented by [9]. If over time, the relative likelihood of
Table A1
Regression result at order level.
Group 1 Group 2
Order Coefficient of
intercept
Coefficient of
Lagavgrating
Is coefficient of
Lagavgrating
significantly
different with 1
N Adj R
square
Order Coefficient of
intercept
Coefficient of
Lagavgrating
Is coefficient of
Lagavgrating
significantly
different with 1
N Adj R
square
F-value Yes/no F-value Yes/no
6 1.78*** 0.58*** 443.33*** Yes 6250 0.13 80 0.03 0.98*** 0.35 No 6250 0.18
8 1.40*** 0.64*** 301.26*** Yes 6250 0.14 82 −0.05 0.96*** 1.78 No 6250 0.18
10 1.02*** 0.74*** 157.12*** Yes 6250 0.17 84 −0.03 0.99*** 0.04 No 6250 0.18
12 0.97*** 0.75*** 126.20*** Yes 6250 0.17 86 −0.07 0.96*** 1.71 No 6250 0.17
14 0.89*** 0.75*** 124.23*** Yes 6250 0.16 88 −0.7 0.99*** 0.03 No 6250 0.18
16 1.23*** 0.71*** 145.73*** Yes 6250 0.14 90 0.01 0.98*** 0.89 No 6250 0.17
18 0.73*** 0.78*** 81.86*** Yes 6250 0.16 92 0.01 0.98*** 0.33 No 6250 0.18
20 0.77*** 0.78*** 82.26*** Yes 6250 0.16 94 −0.05 0.99*** 0.10 No 6250 0.18
22 0.84*** 0.76*** 94.44*** Yes 6250 0.14 96 0.21 0.96*** 2.19 No 6250 0.17
24 0.90*** 0.74*** 124.73*** Yes 6250 0.14 98 −0.08 0.96*** 1.71 No 6250 0.17
*** P≤0.01.
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brag or moan stays the same, then our results should still hold.
Furthermore, if the probability of brag or moan changes over time,
then results based on OLS estimation might not be valid due to the
variance of the error term changing over time. We conduct a White
test to check the heteroscedasticity. The results show that hetero-
scedasticity does exist. As discussed before, we corrected the potential
heteroscedasticity in our data according to the method proposed in
Long and Ervin [10]. Qualitatively the results still hold.
A.3. Robustness check: Case III
Our results may be driven by the number of the ratings which was
used to calculate the Lag(avgrating). Recall that for each item, group 1
includes the 6th to the 25th review received by each item,while group
2 includes the 81th to the 100th review received by each item. Hence,
the Lag(avgrating) in group 1 (due to the small number of ratings)
may include more statistical error and less stability than that of group
2. For example, for review 16 in group 1, we used ratings of the 1st to
the 15th review (15 reviews) to estimate its Lag(avgrating), however,
for review 91 in group 2, we used ratings of the 1st to the 90th review
(90 reviews) to estimate its Lag(avgrating). In order to get a
comparable estimation of the Lagavgrating in these two groups, we
defined a new way to estimate Lagavgrating for group 2, which uses
only the nearest 10 lag reviews to calculate the lag average rating. For
example, when the dependent variable Rating is the 100th review
(order), we just use the mean rating of the 90th review to the 99th
review to approximate its independent variable Lag(avgrating).
Qualitatively the regression results still do not change.
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